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Page 1 of 35 pages

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MBFR COMPLIANCE MONITORING NEEDS AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES

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MBFR OUTLINE

- NATURE OF MBFR
 - NEGOTIATED/PROJECTED AGREEMENTS
 - FORCE TO BE MONITORED
 - RANGE OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
- THE MONITORING RESPONSE
 - ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES
 - DEPARTURES FROM SALT
 - MULTILATERAL CONSENSUS
- MONITORING ASSETS
 - ELINT, COMINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT, RADINT
- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 - MONITORING STRATEGIES
 - COLLECTION ASSET MULTIPLIERS

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NATO GUIDELINES AREA

Western Participants

Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Federal Republic
of Germany
Canada
United Kingdom
United States

Eastern Participants

German Democratic Republic
Poland
Czechoslovakia
USSR




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GSFG UNITS IN 50 BY 100 NM AREA OF SOUTHERN EAST GERMANY



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MBFR STATUS: 1978 PROPOSALS

NATO AND WARSAW PACT

PHASING: U.S. AND USSR FIRST WITH ALL NATIONS COMMITTED TO REDUCE IN PHASE 2

NATO PROPOSAL

PACT PROPOSAL

- | | | |
|------------|--|---|
| REDUCE BY: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5 SOVIET DIVISIONS• 1,700 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS• 68,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL
29,000 U.S. PERSONNEL• U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 2 SOVIET DIVISIONS
1 TANK DIVISION EQUIVALENT
1 SOVIET CORPS HEADQUARTERS• 1,000 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS
250 MICV• 30,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL
14,000 U.S. PERSONNEL |
|------------|--|---|

RESIDUAL SOVIET
GROUND FORCES: 24 TO 26 SOVIET DIVISIONS
7,700 TO 8,400 MAIN BATTLE
TANKS

CANDIDATE MBFR ASSOCIATED MEASURES

- SIZE LIMITS ON MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS
- PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS
- EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS
- NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
- AERIAL INSPECTION
- DECLARED EXIT/ENTRY POINTS
- PERMANENT OBSERVERS AT EXIT/ENTRY POINTS
- EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MANPOWER TO BE WITHDRAWN
- ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON RESIDUAL FORCES
- PREANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF RESIDUAL FORCES
- LIAISON ORGANIZATION

PROBABLE MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

- MILITARY PERSONNEL

SOVIET GROUND/AIR NOT TO EXCEED 45,000

TOTAL WARSAW PACT IN NGA NOT TO EXCEED 700,000 GROUND FORCES
200,000 AIRMEN

- EQUIPMENT LIMIT

SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS NOT TO EXCEED 8,000

- EXERCISE LIMIT

SIZE OF SIMULTANEOUS FIELD EXERCISES

NUMBER OF FIELD EXERCISES PER YEAR ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE

- UNIT LIMIT

POSSIBLE LIMIT ON NUMBER/SIZE OF DIVISIONS

ESTABLISHING MBFR MONITORING PRIORITIES


- OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL MONITORING REQUIREMENTS
 - NATO GOVERNMENTS MUST SATISFY RATIFYING PARLIAMENTS ON COMPLIANCE
 - MONITORING OF SOME MBFR PROVISIONS MAY BE DEFERRED, BUT NOT IGNORED
- PHASE ONE: RESIDUAL SOVIET FORCES STILL AN OFFENSIVE THREAT
 - PRE-HOSTILITIES REINFORCEMENT NOT ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL ATTACK
 - LIMITS ON RESIDUAL FORCE OUT-OF-GARRISON DEPLOYMENT COMMAND HIGH MONITORING PRIORITY
- PHASE TWO: MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS BEGIN
 - DISBANDING OF INDIGENOUS UNITS INTRODUCES NEW MONITORING REQUIREMENTS
 - PERHAPS INTENSIFIED MONITORING EFFORT INSTEAD OF REDIRECTION

MBFR MONITORING DYNAMICS

- MBFR DEPARTS FROM PREVIOUS SALT EXPERIENCE
 - SALT VIOLATIONS TAKE MANY MONTHS TO DEVELOP
 - MBFR CAN BE VIOLATED IN DAYS/HOURS BY REDEPLOYING EXISTING FORCES
- MONITORING PERFORMANCE WILL INFLUENCE PACT INCENTIVE TO VIOLATE MBFR
 - PERCEIVED MONITORING FAILURES ENCOURAGE BOLDNESS
 - SUCCESS WILL PROMOTE PACT RESPECT FOR NATO SENSITIVITY TO ALL ACTIVITIES AND FORCE INDICES OF TREATY AND OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
- MONITORING THROUGH MULTILATERAL CONSENSUS
 - MBFR CHALLENGES WILL BE MADE IN UNIFIED NATO APPROACHES
 - VIOLATION EVIDENCE MUST BE CONVINCING AND RELEASABLE TO ALL APPROPRIATE NATO GOVERNMENTS

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- QUESTIONS: ARE THERE ANY NEW UNITS?
WHAT TYPE OF UNITS ARE IN GIVEN KASERNES?
HOW MANY OF EACH TYPE OF UNIT ARE THERE?
WHERE ARE THE UNITS OF GIVEN TYPES?




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HUMINT FOR MBFR

FOUR TYPES

- NOW:
- ATTACHES, MLMs
 - DEFECTORS, EMIGRES
 - OTHER IN-COUNTRY SOURCES

FUTURE: • NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES

- FIXED EXIT/ENTRY
- MOBILE TEAMS
- EXERCISE OBSERVERS
- AERIAL OBSERVERS

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WARNING/MONITORING INTERFACE

<u>NATION</u>	<u>I&W</u>	<u>KASERNES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF</u> [REDACTED] <u>TARGETS</u>
CSSR	71	56	46%
DDR	97	65	31%
PPR	65	45	35%
TOTAL	233	166	37%

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I&W COMPOSITION: [REDACTED]

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166 KASERNES
 51 AIRFIELDS/AIR AMMO DEPOT
 12 NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE SITES
 3 TRAINING/MANEUVER AREAS
 2 NAVAL BASES
 1 RAIL TRANSLOADING AREA
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CONCLUSIONS

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- WITH INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT OF EXISTING AND PLANNED INTELLIGENCE ASSETS, MBFR MONITORING CAN BE FULFILLED WITH MODEST ADDITIONAL SYSTEM ACQUISITION.

[REDACTED]

- TIMELY CONTEXT ON ALL FORCES AND ACTIVITIES IN THE NGA IS ESSENTIAL TO RESOLVING ANOMALIES.
- MOST MBFR MONITORING JUDGEMENTS WILL DEPEND ON THE AGGREGATE COLLECTION OF MANY DIFFERENT SENSORS.
- INTELLIGENCE INDICATING MBFR ANOMALIES MUST BE RELEASABLE TO NATO ALLIES.

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EXAMPLES OF SHARING OPTIONS RANGE

	<u>NATIONAL ONLY</u>	<u>SHARED INFORMATION</u>	<u>JOINT SYSTEM</u>
<u>CONVENTIONAL COLLECTION</u>			
ATTACHES/MLMs		X	
DEFECTORS		X	
NEGOTIATED INSPECTION			X
OTHER HUMINT	X		
<u>THEATER ASSETS</u>			
25X1D <div></div>		X	
		X	
		X	
		X	?
		X	?
		X	?
<u>SPACE-BASED ASSETS</u>			
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		?	?
		X	?
		X	?

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NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES

TO FACILITATE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

- LIMIT SIZE AND NUMBER OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS
- EXCLUDE PERSONNEL OF LOW SIGNATURE UNITS
- FIXED ENTRY/EXIT POSTS
- NOTIFY/EXPLAIN NEW CONSTRUCTION, EQUIPMENT TYPES, AND RESUBORDINATION
- CALL SIGN CHANGE LIMIT

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